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Privacy in Location-
Aware Computing
Environments
T
he boundary between cyberspace and
physical space is fading. Location-
aware technologies, such as sensor
networks, enable everyday devices to
become increasingly, and often invis-
ibly, interconnected with one another and with the
Internet. Some analysts predict that by 2010 half
of all cell phone users in the US will be using loca-
tion-based services.1 Today, users struggle to main-
tain the security of their individual computing
devices and have difficulty man-
aging their privacy online.
Tomorrow, these challenges
might be unimaginably com-
plex, as location-aware tech-
nologies embedded in both
devices and environments reveal
not only personal information
but also location and context information.
The way users think about these more complex
privacy issues and how they attempt to manage
them have implications for the privacy and secu-
rity of persons, places, and systems. Research con-
cerned with privacy in location-aware technologies
often focuses on systems and software for privacy
policy management.2–4 As with much new tech-
nology, however, users’ interests and concerns (par-
ticularly regarding privacy and security) are not
always reflected in the design of new technolo-
gies.5,6 As a result, people often use new technolo-
gies in unforeseen ways,7,8 which could compro-
mise privacy and security.9
We have conducted a study, using the experi-
ence sampling method (see the sidebar), in which
we observe 25 users, all undergraduate students,
for one week to examine their willingness to share
location information in various settings and with
different requesters. ESM lets researchers observe
actors in situ over time. We also investigated
whether willingness to share location informa-
tion varied depending on who was seeking the
information.
Other studies of how users respond to location
requests have specified the requester by relation-
ship and role or by name.10,11 For example,
Sunny Consolvo and her colleagues found that
the person requesting location information (for
example, spouse, coworker, or boss) influences
user willingness to share in different situations.11
Here, we use broader categories of requesters
rather than specific named individuals or specific
relationships. An advantage of these more open-
ended categories is that they can better exploit
the capabilities of some ubiquitous computing
systems—for instance, environments with embed-
ded sensor technology could capture location
information, or even more complex social con-
text information, that can be transmitted broadly
to anyone requesting information about that
place or about the users.
Place and social context
In our study, we are interested in users’ privacy
preferences according to place. As sociologists
This study explores how privacy preferences vary with place and social
context. These findings are useful for designing privacy policies and user
interfaces for pervasive computing.
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and other social scientists explain, place
means more than simply space or loca-
tion. According to Thomas Gieryn,12
place has three necessary features: geo-
graphic location, material form, and cul-
tural meaning. The last of these indicates
that social actors understand what types
of behaviors are expected in particular
places. That is, people invest certain val-
ues and meanings into particular spaces.
For example, different behaviors are ex-
pected in a bar than in a place of wor-
ship. Moreover, people might behave
somewhat differently in different places,
even when engaged in the same type of
activity—for example, eating at home
versus at a diner, or at a four-star restau-
rant, or in the home of your boss. (A
lively debate has emerged about whether
cyberspace is indeed a place, since vir-
tual worlds do not have physicality in
the same way as a building or park.12,13
Surprisingly, this debate is an old one,
beginning as early as the emergence of
the telegraph.7,14 Use of terms such as
virtual world and cyber café, as well as
the technical necessities of designing and
architecting such spaces, suggests that
we culturally interpret many online
spaces similarly to how we think about
social places.)
Location-sensing technology raises
interesting problems for place, such as
the expectations users have for privacy in
particular places8 or while engaged in
specific activities.13 But place also raises
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D iary methods are a group of research tools and methodsused in psychology for “documenting the particulars of
life.”1 The distinguishing feature of a diary method is that partici-
pants self-report their own ongoing experiences. This feature en-
ables the recording of events and experiences in a more natural
context than a formal interview. Diary methods fall into three cate-
gories: interval contingent (where participants report at regular in-
tervals), signal contingent (where participants report when they re-
ceive a signal), and event contingent (where participants report
whenever a defined event occurs).2
Within the broader category of diary methods, the experience
sampling method (ESM) has emerged as a popular method for
evaluating user experiences and situations.3 In an ESM study, also
called an ecological momentary assessment, participants fill out a
questionnaire several times a day. The questionnaire asks about
their current activities, conditions, and feelings. A typical ESM
study is signal contingent, involving seven signals a day over seven
days. Christie Napa Scollon, Chu Kim-Prieto, and Ed Diener pre-
sented a survey of how researchers have used ESM to evaluate a
wide variety of experiences.4 In particular, some researchers have
used ESM to evaluate communications technology: Robert Kubey,
Reed Larson, and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi surveyed communications-
related ESM studies such as television viewing.5 Sunny Consolvo
and Miriam Walker used ESM to evaluate user experiences with the
Intel Personal Server ubiquitous computing device.6
As in our study, technology can improve ESM methodology.
Instead of using a notebook or paper questionnaires to record
responses, Leysia Palen and Marilyn Salzman ask their participants
to record voicemail messages upon receiving an alert.7 Another
common electronic ESM tool to use for questionnaires is a PDA,8
and more recently a mobile phone.9,10 Our study is similar to that
of Jon Froehlich and his colleagues,10 in that we combine event-
and signal-contingent alerts (although this article concentrates
only on results from our signal-contingent alerts). On the other
hand, we chose not to use such technology for recording
responses, but we combined the traditional notebook with
network monitoring to better interpret the data we collected.
REFERENCES
1. N. Bolger, A. Davis, and E. Rafaeli, “Diary Methods: Capturing Life as It
Is Lived,” Ann. Rev. of Psychology, Feb. 2003, pp. 579–616.
2. L. Wheeler and H.T. Reis, “Self-Recording of Everyday Life Events: Ori-
gins, Types, and Uses,” J. Personality, vol. 59, no. 3, 1991, pp. 339–354.
3. R. Larson and M. Csikszentmihalyi, The Experience Sampling Method,
New Directions for Methodology of Social and Behavioral Science, vol. 15,
1983, Jossey-Bass.
4. C.N. Scollon, C. Kim-Prieto, and E. Diener, “Experience Sampling:
Promises and Pitfalls, Strengths and Weaknesses,” J. Happiness Studies,
vol. 4, no. 1, 2003, pp. 5–34.
5. R. Kubey, R. Larson, and M. Csikszentmihalyi, “Experience Sampling
Method Applications to Communication Research Questions,” J. Com-
munication, vol. 46, no. 2, 1996, pp. 99-120.
6. S. Consolvo and M. Walker, “Using the Experience Sampling Method to
Evaluate Ubicomp Applications,” IEEE Pervasive Computing, vol. 2, no. 2,
2003, pp. 24–31.
7. L. Palen and M. Salzman, “Voicemail Diary Studies for Naturalistic Data
Capture under Mobile Conditions,” Proc. ACM Conf. Computer
Supported Collaborative Work (CSCW 02), ACM Press, 2002, pp. 87–95.
8. L.F. Barrett and D.J. Barrett, “An Introduction to Computerized Experi-
ence Sampling in Psychology,” Social Science Computer Rev., vol. 19, no.
2, 2001, pp. 175–185.
9. S.S. Intille et al., “A Context-Aware Experience Sampling Tool,” Proc.
Conf. Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI 03), ACM Press, 2003,
pp. 972–973.
10. J. Froehlich et al., “MyExperience: A System for In Situ Tracing and Cap-
turing of User Feedback on Mobile Phones,” Proc. 5th Int’l Conf. Mobile
Systems, Applications and Services (MobiSys 07), ACM Press, 2007, pp.
57–70.
The Experience Sampling Method
questions for location-sensing technol-
ogy. For example, is the relevant loca-
tion information that must be sensed or
transmitted the absolute geographic
location such as GPS coordinates or
room numbers, or is it the socially
defined place such as home or work?11,13
Of course what is considered relevant
information will vary according to the
person asking and the purpose of the
information.11,13
Social context is an important aspect
of place. It concerns how people define
where they are, what they are doing, and
who they are with at the time. Our study
examines how users’ real-time location
privacy preferences are associated with
their social context within and across
specific places.
The user study
In June 2004, we recruited participants
for a computer activity study using a Web
site and college bulletin boards. The Web
site used a registration form to preselect
participants (for example, to make sure
they owned a mobile wireless device). We
interviewed the respondents and selected
30 participants: 15 male and 15 female.
All of the participants were undergradu-
ate students (with a mean age of 20). One
participant (male) dropped out during the
study, and four others (one male, three
female) did not answer an adequate num-
ber of location requests to be included in
the analyses reported here; these partici-
pants’ data are excluded from the results,
leaving a total of 25 participants. We gave
each participant a pager and a question-
naire notebook, which they agreed to
carry for seven consecutive days (see the
“Technology for ESM” sidebar for
details). At the end of the seven days, we
interviewed and debriefed each partici-
pant (and paid them $100 for their time).
The study followed a strict protocol ap-
proved by the Dartmouth College insti-
tutional review board.
Participants provided conflict times,
during which they did not want to be
paged—for example, when they were
asleep or in an examination. Outside
these times, each participant received up
to seven pager alerts per day at random
times. Each alert occurred at least 45
minutes after the preceding alert, to pre-
vent the alerts from being too intrusive.
At each page, the questionnaire con-
tained questions about current activities,
location, communications usage (wired,
wireless, Voice over Internet Protocol,
and other communications devices), how
many people they were with, and their
willingness to share location information.
The questionnaire included a total of 203
possible questions per pager alert, but the
number of questions varied according to
the participant’s activities. For example,
at each page in which participants
reported using an electronic device (any
type, though most often participants
were using a laptop computer), they were
asked whether they would be willing to
share their location. The exact wording
was, “Which, if any, of the following
would you be willing to inform of your
current location (for example, GPS coor-
dinates or building name)?”—with the
following three categories of responses:
 anyone who asked (yes/no);
 anyone who sent email to you
(yes/no); or 
 anyone from the list you specified
(yes/no).
For the last category, we did not ask
them to actually identify specific indi-
viduals or relationships, so this category
indicates their general willingness to
share with particular persons they know.
Other research has observed that there is
likely variation in sharing across known
intimates,10,11 but we cannot test for such
differences here. Instead, we examine dif-
ferences between this category and the
two other categories of more distant
requesters. The first category, anyone
who asked, was meant to be as open-
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I n our user study on privacy, we issued each participant a pagerand a questionnaire notebook. The pager was a Motorola Bravo
numeric pager operating in the 406-512 MHz band. To program-
matically send pages to the participants, we used an SMTP-to-page
(simple mail transfer protocol) gateway operated by the pager ser-
vice provider. The notebook contained questions about communi-
cations use (wired, wireless, and other communications devices),
current activities, location, and so forth.
We chose to use a notebook for several reasons: First, our
questionnaires were extensive, containing 203 possible ques-
tions, including multipart and open-ended questions. So, it
would be impractical to fill them out using a standard PDA. Sec-
ond, we considered using a PDA equipped with an 802.11 network
adapter so that we could use the same device for signaling partici-
pants, for having participants fill out questionnaires, and for trans-
mitting the questionnaire responses to a central data-collection
server to limit the possibility of losing data if not adequately saved
on the device. But we rejected this solution, because we would not
be able to signal participants when they were out of range of an
802.11 network (for example, if they were off campus). Moreover,
participants could not be signaled if the 802.11 network was having
trouble, which was one of the aspects that we were interested in
monitoring. Therefore, rather than requiring participants to carry
two electronic devices (a pager and a PDA), which would only in-
crease the probability of a device malfunctioning during the study,
we decided to use a pager and a notebook.
Technology for ESM
ended as possible, but some participants
could have interpreted this category more
narrowly to exclude retailers or other
institutional requesters. Finally, the ques-
tion asked about current location and
provided GPS coordinates or building
names as examples of types of location
information. (User preferences can vary,
depending on the type of location infor-
mation disclosed, but we cannot examine
those issues in this study.)
We also tracked participants wired
and wireless network usage using system
log and Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol records, Simple Network Man-
agement Protocol polls, email server
logs, and network sniffing. (Further
details are available elsewhere.15)
Sample limitations
One study goal was to evaluate how
users respond to location-seeking requests
during real-world usage. But, of course,
our study has several limitations. One lim-
itation is that we asked about willingness
to share location information only when
participants reported using an electronic
device. However, sensor and other new
technologies will likely enable location-
sensing capabilities regardless of active
usage of devices (for example, cell phones
have active GPS technology, regardless of
usage), and environment-embedded sen-
sors could capture a user’s location even
when they are not carrying devices. There-
fore, our study does not fully capture the
entire range of experiences in which loca-
tion privacy is relevant.
Of course, the most serious limitation of
our sample is the use of only undergradu-
ate college students. Clearly, this is not a
representative sample of all users, or even
of all college students, although few if any
ESM studies are representative in a statis-
tical sense because of very small sample
sizes. College students have lifestyles and
technology-usage patterns that are often
specific to this population group. On the
one hand, college students’ high usage rates
of many different technologies and devices,
including mobile technologies, could be an
important bellwether of the types of pri-
vacy concerns and conflicts that might arise
as location-aware technologies become
more prevalent. On the other hand, col-
lege students’ apparent willingness to
engage in high-risk technology behavior
such as password sharing and peer-to-peer
file sharing could mean they are far less
concerned with privacy issues than are
population groups. Future research, includ-
ing studies of representative samples of the
population such as in survey research, must
examine whether population groups vary
in their concerns about, or willingness to
share, location information.
Results
Before detailing the privacy-related
aspects of our study, we first describe
some of the basic usage patterns we
observed from the participants.
General usage patterns
The 25 participants received a total of
1,114 pages over the seven-day study
period, or an average of 44.5 alerts per
participant—about six pages per day for
each participant. Overall, participants
answered 92 percent of the pages received
(n = 1,025). Reasons for failing to answer
a page included sleeping, showering, eat-
ing, and forgetting to carry the pager. For
nearly half (44 percent) of all pages
answered, participants were with other
people, most often friends (34 percent).
For 46 percent of all pages answered
(n = 468), participants were using some
electronic device. The extensive wireless
network on campus enables students to
be mobile but remain connected through-
out the day. We monitored participants’
use of the wireless network. In nearly
eight of 10 pages in which they were
using a device, participants were online
(an average of six hours per day on the
campus wireless network, with 40 per-
cent exceeding six hours per day). Over
two-thirds of participants were mobile
on one or more days of the study, where
mobility is defined as accessing two or
more wireless access points (APs) at least
50 meters apart. Mobile participants vis-
ited an average of 22.6 different APs dur-
ing the week. (At the time, the campus
network included more than 500 APs.)
Place and technology usage
Participants were more likely to be at
home during a page than in any other
location during the study. Participants
reported being at home for 48 percent
of all pages, as table 1 shows. While at
home, participants used one or more
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TABLE 1
Pages answered and location requests made at various places.
Pages answered Location requests
Place during page No. % No. % of pages
Home 488 47.6 328 70.4
Work or other 123 12.0 16 12.0
Dining or restaurant 111 10.8 20 18.0
Classroom 73 7.1 15 20.5
Library 69 6.7 53 76.8
Friend’s home 65 6.3 29 44.6
In transit 96 9.4 7 7.3
Total 1,025 99.9* 468 45.7
* Total doesn’t add to 100% due to rounding
electronic devices during more than two-
thirds of the pages (70.4 percent). Al-
though participants answered fewer
pages in certain locations such as the
library, if they were using a device at the
time of the page, they would at least
respond to the location-request ques-
tions. Thus, participants responded to
many location requests in the library, for
example, but very few while in transit.
Sharing location information
Table 2 shows participants’ willing-
ness to share location information, over-
all and within specific places. As the
table indicates, participants were willing
to share location information for half of
all requests. Overall, participants were
significantly more likely to share loca-
tion information with people in the list
they specified (49 percent) than with
email contacts (10 percent) or with any-
one who asked (8 percent). The statisti-
cal differences for sharing across cate-
gories of requesters overall also hold for
each specific place. In addition, people
were statistically significantly more will-
ing to share with email requesters than
with anyone who asked when at home,
in the library, or at other public places
(statistical results not shown).
When we consider how place is related
to willingness to share location infor-
mation, we find some surprising pat-
terns. The emergence of new technolo-
gies for social networking (for example,
www.dodgeball.com and www.meetro.
com) suggests that when users are out
with friends or engaged in social activi-
ties, they will want to reveal their loca-
tion information so that others can join
them.1 Similarly, some research suggests
that users are less likely to reveal loca-
tion when they are at home (versus at
work) or engaged in certain types of pri-
vate or semiprivate activities, such as
studying or going out on a date.11,13
Our participants, in contrast, were more
willing to share when they were at home
or in the library compared to when they
were in other public places or at friends’
homes. Consistent with the patterns of
sharing overall, at each place participants
were more willing to share with specific
requesters on the list they specified than
with broader categories of requesters.
Revealed privacy policies
Examining the patterns of sharing
location information across the three dif-
ferent requester categories indicates that
our participants fit into three types of
revealed location-privacy policies. We do
not use the term policy to mean a preset
plan in which users choose a privacy set-
ting before usage, which then governs
their devices and applications. Instead,
given that it arises from the users’ actual
behavior over time, we use policy in a
more organic sense to mean the apparent
rule that participants follow.
The majority of participants in our
study had a consistent policy for sharing
across all conditions and situations. Nine
participants answered no to all location-
sharing questions, with all requester cat-
egories, every time, so we label them con-
sistent-private (CP) users. In contrast, 10
participants answered at every request
that they would share their location with
requesters who were on the list they spec-
ified. We label this group the consistent-
share-with-friends (CSWF) users.
Different from both types of consistent
users were the six participants who var-
ied in their willingness to share location
information with different requester cat-
egories, depending on the situation. We
label them variable-privacy (VP) users.
Of all the times they were asked to share
location information, VP users were will-
ing to share most often with requesters
who were on the list they specified (74
percent of all requests), but sometimes
they were also willing to share with email
contacts (36 percent) or even with any-
one who asked (28 percent).
Although the number of participants
in each category (particularly the VP cat-
egory) is relatively small, the policies
themselves are based on participants’
behavior over a minimum of eight pages
per user. CP users had a mean of 19
pages each in which they responded
about their willingness to share location
information; CSWF users had 17 pages
each; VP users had 21 pages each.
Figure 1 shows how VP and CSWF
users compare in their willingness to share
location information according to place
at the time of the request. CSWF users
were somewhat more likely to share when
at home compared to VP users. Analysis
of variance (ANOVA) shows F = 3.4, df = 1
and 221, and P  0.10, where F is the ratio
of the estimate of between-group variance
to the estimate of within-group variance,
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TABLE 2
Participants’ willingness to share location information at different places, for different categories of requesters.
Percent willing to 
share with at least one Percent willing to Percent willing to Percent willing to
Place during page requester category* share with list* share with email* share with anyone*
Home 55.2 54.3 10.4 6.1
Friend’s home 27.6 28.0 6.9 0
Library 51.0 50.9 37.7 22.6
Other public place 32.8 31.0 13.8 6.9
Overall (regardless 50.1 49.0 10.0 8.0
of place)*
* For all percentages, the denominator was the number of requests.
df is the number of degrees of freedom,
and P is the significance level. When at
friends’ homes, however, CSWF users
were significantly less willing than VP
users to share location information, pos-
sibly because they were willing to share
only with people on their list and they
were interacting with them already
(ANOVA: F = 6.4, df = 1 and 10, P  0.01).
Given the small number of cases with
which to compare, however, the differ-
ence at friends’ homes must be considered
merely suggestive. There were no statisti-
cal differences between CSWF and VP
users in willingness to share when in the
library or in other public places.
Figure 2 shows the extent to which VP
users were willing to share location infor-
mation with specific types of requesters at
different places. VP users were most will-
ing to share with requesters in their list and
with anyone who asked when they were in
the library—a public space. It is unclear
why they were less willing to share with
email partners than with anyone when in
the library. In contrast, they were most
willing to share with email contacts when
in other public places, such as restaurants,
other public buildings, or outdoor areas.
Not surprisingly, VP users were not will-
ing to share with anyone who asked when
at friends’ homes, possibly to protect their
friends’ privacy. In contrast, VP users were
willing to share with anyone who asked
when they were at home in just over 20
percent of requests.
Location privacy and social context
In addition to the location aspect of
place, the social context of place—who
the participants were with at the time of
the request—also had some affect on
their willingness to share location infor-
mation. Participants were far more will-
ing to share regardless of requester cate-
gory when they were alone. However,
once again, place (for example, home ver-
sus a public setting) also mattered, as fig-
ure 3 shows. Our participants were less
willing to reveal location information
when they were with others (typically
friends) than when they were alone. The
influence of being with friends was sta-
tistically stronger when participants were
at home (ANOVA: F = 10.3, df = 1 and
217, P  0.01) or in the library (ANOVA:
F = 5.04, df = 1 and 26, P  0.05). (There
was no statistical difference in willing-
ness to share between being alone or with
others when they were at a friend’s home
or at some other public location—but, of
course, participants were less likely to be
alone in such places, especially friends’
homes.) These findings suggest that when
participants were alone at home or in the
library, they were more interested in
enabling social contact—that is, having
others find them—and possibly less con-
cerned about privacy, even when they
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Figure 1. Consistent-share-with-friends
(CSWF) and variable-privacy (VP) users’
willingness to share according to place at
the time of the request.
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Figure 2. VP users’ willingness to share with the three different requester categories
according to place.
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were at home. Indeed, they may have
interpreted location requests as questions
similar to “are you available to do some-
thing?” rather than simply “where are
you?” In contrast, although participants
were often willing to let others locate
them when they were with friends, they
seemed to indicate that they were con-
tent in the group they were with and not
interested in having others find them.
We explored this issue further by ana-
lyzing VP users’ willingness to share with
different requester categories according
to place depending on whether they were
alone. Somewhat surprisingly, when VP
users were alone at home, they were will-
ing to share their location with anyone
who asked for 25 percent of the requests,
with email contacts for 39 percent of the
requests, and with their list for 79 per-
cent of the requests. When VP users were
alone and not at home, including when
they were exercising, in class, at work,
eating in a restaurant, or in transit, they
were the most willing to reveal location
to people on their list (85 percent), fol-
lowed by anyone who asked (59 per-
cent), and then email contacts (37 per-
cent). It is not clear why participants
would be more willing to share with any-
one who asked than with email contacts,
no matter what the situation; however,
there is no statistical difference between
willingness to share with anyone and
email contacts in this situation.
When VP users were with friends and
not at home (typically engaged in a social
activity such as at a sporting event), they
were never willing to reveal location to just
anyone who asked, but they were some-
times willing to reveal location to email
contacts (about 25 percent of requests),
and often willing to reveal location to peo-
ple on their list (75 percent of requests).
When VP users were with friends at home
(for example, watching television or a
DVD, playing video games, or studying),
they were occasionally willing to reveal
location to anyone who asked (6 percent),
and somewhat more willing to reveal loca-
tion to email contacts (29 percent) and
their list (53 percent).
General privacy
and security concerns
During the study, we also asked par-
ticipants about their concerns regarding
the privacy and security of email and
instant messaging at each page in which
they had participated in those types of
communication in the previous 30 min-
utes. Here, we briefly describe how par-
ticipants in our three revealed-privacy-
policy categories rated their level of
concern (on a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 = not
concerned at all and 5 = very concerned)
regarding the privacy of email and instant
messaging, and how important they rated
the security of these types of communi-
cation (rated on a similar 5-point scale).
Table 3 shows that CSWF users had
significantly lower levels of concern about
the privacy of email compared to both CP
and VP users. VP users had the highest
level of privacy concerns for both email
and instant messaging, and these levels
were significantly higher than for CSWF
users. VP users also rated the importance
of email and instant-messaging security
higher than both CP and CSWF users. VP
concerns might be related to their having
the highest usage of both email and
instant messaging.
Although privacy and security con-
cerns about email and instant messaging
are not exactly the same as concerns
about location privacy and security,
users’ location policy preferences could
be related to concerns about privacy in
general, albeit not in a straightforward
way. That is, those most willing to share
location information with the most
requester categories were also the most
concerned about privacy and security of
email and instant messaging. During the
prestudy interview, we asked partici-
pants to rate their level of concern about
the security of the wireless network they
use. Surprisingly, given the differences
we found in revealed privacy policies for
location sharing, we found no differ-
ences in security concerns across the
three privacy policy categories.
P
articipants in this study fell into
three categories of sharing: those
who never shared, those always
willing to share with those on
their list regardless of place, and those
willing to share with different requester
categories depending on place and social
context. This suggests that for at least
some users, privacy concerns vary across
place and context, and therefore privacy
policy controls need to be flexible
enough so that users can satisfy their
preferences. Such findings are consistent
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Figure 3. VP and CSWF users’ willingness
to share according to place and social
context.
with previous research findings that pri-
vacy preferences vary across activities,13
situations,10 and requesters.10,11 Yet, we
also found that many participants were
highly consistent in their willingness to
share location information, indicating
that some users might be comfortable
setting policy preferences once to gov-
ern all future use. The difference between
consistent and variable-privacy cate-
gories identified in this study suggests
that privacy may encompass both as-
pects of Leysia Palen and Paul Dourish’s
distinction between privacy as a dynamic
social process and privacy as something
dichotomous and statelike.16 Given the
limitations of our sample, as well as the
complexity of these issues, we cannot
draw firm conclusions. However, our
findings suggest that further exploration
of how and for whom privacy prefer-
ences are context dependent may be an
important avenue of study.
Location-sensing technologies raise
many exciting possibilities for the com-
munication and delivery of services
among users, devices, and places. These
technologies also raise potential privacy
and security conflicts if users don’t
understand how or what is being sensed
or transmitted, or if they don’t have ade-
quate control over such information.
Our study of users’ revealed location-
privacy policies indicates that develop-
ing pervasive computing environments
that include location-sensing technolo-
gies requires understanding how pref-
erences vary across place and social
context for different user groups. For
example, our study indicates that at
least some users value simple privacy
policies for their location-sensing appli-
cations and devices. Other users, how-
ever, might require more complex user
interfaces for creating privacy policies
that express a default policy with con-
tingencies for special cases or that let
users respond to individual requests
and change preference settings in real
time. The challenge in both cases is to
develop interfaces that can adequately
control information commensurate with
user preferences but that do not con-
stantly interrupt users.
Our study also has implications regard-
ing the kinds of location-sensing applica-
tions that users might want to use. For
example, users seem more open to appli-
cations connecting them to others when
they are alone rather than when they are
already engaged in activities with friends
and others.
Further research is required to better
understand location privacy behavior
across a broader sample population.
We also need to explore privacy behav-
ior across a larger range of context-
sharing technology. With a better
understanding of these behaviors, we
can design appropriate policy languages
and user interfaces to encode privacy
preferences in ways that will meet the
expectations of users of context-aware
technologies.
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